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THE APPOINTMENT OF UNION
REPRESENTATIVES TO CREDITORS'
COMMITTEES UNDER CHAPTER 11 OF
THE BANKRUPTCY CODE@
THOMAS R. HAGGARD*
When a company files for reorganization under Chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code,1 the financial interests of its business
creditors are suddenly and dramatically affected. When, how,
and whether the debts owed creditors will be paid are no longer
determined by the free play of market forces and the law of con-
tracts, but rather by a "reorganization plan" that is subject to
the approval of the bankruptcy court.
The interests of the debtor's employees and of any union
representing them are also significantly affected by a Chapter 11
proceeding, albeit in a slightly different way. Although employ-
ees have interests like any other creditor with respect to back
wages, accrued fringe benefits, and the like, they have an even
more compelling interest in the Chapter 11 proceeding's effect
upon their present and future relationship with the debtor-em-
ployer.While the Bankruptcy Code provides some degree of pri-
ority to wage and pension claims,2 individual employees are es-
sentially left to the mercy of the process. On the other hand,
unions representing organized employees have made more vigor-
ous attempts to vindicate employee and union interests in Chap-
©Copyright reserved, 1984, by Thomas R. Haggard.
*Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law; B.A., University of
Texas at Austin, 1964; LL.B., University of Texas School of Law, 1967. Research for this
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Industrial Research Unit, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. Deborah Wil-
liamson Witt, University of South Carolina School of Law, Class of 1986, also gave valua-
ble assistance in the preparation of this article. I would also like to thank my colleague,
Assistant Professor Howard Stravitz, for his useful comments and criticisms. In all in-
stances, however, the views expressed herein are entirely those of the author.
This article will appear as a chapter in a book on the relationship between bank-
ruptcy and labor law, to be published by the Industrial Research Unit, Wharton School,
University of Pennsylvania, in 1985.
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1984).
2. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3), (4)(1984).
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ter 11 reorganizations. Such interests, moreover, almost always
derive, directly or indirectly, from a collective bargaining agree-
ment between the union and the debtor-employer.
Initially, the unions argued that collective bargaining agree-
ments, unlike other executory contracts, should be subject to re-
jection, if at all, only if continued observance would necessarily
cause the reorganization to fail and thus force the debtor-em-
ployer into liquidation.' The unions also argued that, until the
bankruptcy court actually approves the rejection of the agree-
ment, a debtor-employer should be required to keep the collec-
tive bargaining agreement in full force and effect, as purportedly
mandated under the provisions of the Labor Management Rela-
tions (Taft-Hartley) Act (LMRA).
4
The Supreme Court rejected both of these arguments ini
NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco.5 By concluding that the "liquida-
tion" standard advocated by the unions was inappropriate, the
Court went further than the "business judgment" test used to
evaluate the "rejectability" of other commercial contracts in a
Chapter 11 proceeding. With respect to collective bargaining
agreements, the Court adopted an intermediate approach: the
bankruptcy court must first determine if the agreement "bur-
dens the estate";8 if it does, then the Court must balance all of
the equities involved to determine whether they favor rejection
over acceptance. The Court also held that between the filing of
a petition and the ultimate approval of a reorganization plan, a
collective bargaining agreement ceases to be an "enforceable
contract" under the LMRA, a holding which justifies the debtor-
employer's suspension of performance.8
Having lost on these two arguments, the unions immedi-
ately turned to Congress. In a last-minute compromise, Congress
3. This strict standard was adopted by the Second Circuit in Brotherhood of Rail-
way, Airline and Steamship Clerks v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976).
4. The National Labor Relations Board had agreed with this argument by holding
that a debtor-employer violates §§ 8(a)(5) and 8(d) of the Labor Management Relations
(Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (d)(1982), when it unilaterally repudiates a
collective bargaining agreement. Bildisco & Bildisco, 255 N.L.R.B. 1203 (1981), enforce-
ment denied, 682 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1982), af'd, 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984).
5. 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984).
6. Id. at 1196.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1199.
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modified the Bildisco approach slightly.9 Under the newly en-
acted provisions, a debtor-in-possession can alter or reject a col-
lective bargaining agreement only after a hearing on the issue in
bankruptcy court.10 Prior to the hearing, the employer must of-
fer the union a proposal outlining the modifications in employee
benefits and protections that the employer believes "are neces-
sary to permit the reorganization of the debtor and assures [sic]
that all creditors, the debtor and all of the affected parties are
treated fairly and equitably."11 The debtor-in-possession must
also provide the union "with such relevant information as is nec-
essary to evaluate the proposal,"12 and then "meet, at reasonable
times, with the authorized representative to confer in good faith
in attempting to reach mutually satisfactory modifications of
such agreement."' i The bankruptcy court can then approve a
9. 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (1984).
10. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(f)(1984). This changes, with respect to collective bargaining
agreements only, the general rule of bankruptcy law that a debtor-in-possession can sus-
pend performance of an executory contract pending court approval of the rejection of
that contract. That rule was the predicate of the Supreme Court's decision in Bildisco
that such suspension was therefore not an unfair labor practice in violation of LMRA §
8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1982). It is unclear whether the effect of the amendment will
now be to reactivate the unfair labor practice provisions of the LMRA. While this new
provision does not expressly reject the judicial gloss Bildisco placed on LMRA § 8(d), the
better reading of the two statutes would be to accept that gloss, thus making the Bank-
ruptcy Code the exclusive source of law on the unilateral rejection issue. This reading is
also consistent with 11 U.S.C. § 1113(e), which authorizes the bankruptcy court, prior to
its final approval of the rejection, to order interim changes, if they are "essential to the
continuation of the debtor's business," or necessary "in order to avoid irreparable dam-
age to the estate," a process which would be severely impeded if the labor statute were
also applicable.
11. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A)(1984). This language was a compromise between the
proposal of Senator Packwood, which required the debtor-employer to propose "the min-
imum modifications ... that would permit the reorganization," DAILY LABOR REPORT
(BNA) No. 103 at C-4 (May 29, 1984), and the proposal of Senator Thurmond, which on
this point essentially codified the Bildisco test by merely requiring the debtor-employer
to make "reasonable efforts to negotiate a change in the contractual terms," id. at C-3
(emphasis added). The requirement of § 1113(b)(1)(A)(1984)that the debtor-employer's
proposals include those things "necessary to permit the reorganization" adds something
to the Bildisco bargaining requirement. It is difficult to predict, however, how the courts
will interpret this extremely ambiguous language.
12. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(B)(1984).
13. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(2)(1984). The Court in Bildisco had similarly required that
the debtor-employer make "reasonable efforts to negotiate a voluntary modification"
before filing a petition for rejection. 104 S. Ct. at 1196. Apparently, the Court regarded
efforts to negotiate not only as a condition precedent to a later rejection but also as a
part of the debtor-employer's continuing duty under the LMRA to bargain with the
union as the employees' representative, a duty which includes a "good faith" element.
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contract rejection if it finds that the debtor has complied with
these requirements, that the union refused to accept the em-
ployer's proposal "without good cause," '14 and that "the balance
of the equities clearly favors rejection"' 5 of the collective bar-
gaining agreement. The bankruptcy court has fourteen days
within which to hold a hearing on the application for rejection",
and must rule on the application within thirty days after the
commencement of the hearing.'7
It is uncertain how much protection these new Code provi-
sions will actually provide to employee and union interests
under what is still an executory collective bargaining agree-
ment.18 More importantly, it is also unclear how, as a practical
matter, these contract rejection procedures will mesh with the
normal Chapter 11 reorganization process or how they will affect
the negotiations that the debtor conducts with an official com-
mittee of its unsecured creditors, a group whose role in the reor-
ganization process is substantial. The matter is complicated fur-
ther by the fact that unions are increasingly seeking additional
protection of their interests by claiming "creditor" status and
then petitioning for an appointment to the committee of
creditors.' 9
The Court, however, seemed to believe that the two statutory schemes should remain
separate and distinct. Recognizing that the bankruptcy court lacked labor law expertise,
104 S. Ct. at 1197, 1200, the Court apparently intended that the bankruptcy court
merely determine that the debtor made a proposal and that the parties were in fact
unable to agree. The new Code provision, however, seems to give the NLRB and the
bankruptcy court concurrent jurisdiction over the "good faith" issue. Given the different
time frames within which the court and the NLRB operate, this can only create an enor-
mous amount of confusion. The statute is better construed as giving the bankruptcy
court exclusive jurisdiction over the bargaining mandated by § 1113(b)(2)(1984), while
maintaining NLRB jurisdiction over bargaining for any new collective bargaining
agreement.
14. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c)(2)(1984).
15. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c)(3)(1984). This essentially codifies the Bildisco "balancing
approach," 104 S. Ct. at 1196, although the word "clearly" in the statute may evidence a
slight toughening of the Bildisco formula.
16. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(d)(1)(1984).
17. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(d)(2)(1984).
18. See supra notes 10-15. Attorneys for both labor and management concede that
the language of the labor provision is so ambiguous that its real effect will depend heav-
ily on how it is construed by the courts. See House-Senate Conferees Resolve Disputes
on Bankruptcy Bill; Approval is Expected, Wall St. J., June 29, 1984, at 2, col. 3.
19. See generally A Louder Union Voice in Settling Bankruptcies, Bus. WK., Dec.
8, 1980, at 87, 90.
[Vol. 35
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Although such an appointment was affirmed by the Third
Circuit in In re Altair Airlines,20 the matter is not entirely free
of doubt. This Article will explore the parameters of the prob-
lem, with particular emphasis on the effect of the new legislation
upon the union's role in a Chapter 11 reorganization.
I. CREDITORS' COMMITTEES IN GENERAL
Under Chapter 11, the court must appoint a committee of
creditors, "as soon as practicable, 2 1 to represent the interests of
the general, unsecured creditors.22 This committee consists of
the persons who hold the seven largest claims of this type, pro-
vided they are willing to serve in that capacity.23 It is not neces-
sary that these seven largest claimholders be representative of
all of the different kinds of general, unsecured creditors, i.e. re-
present institutional and trade creditors in the exact proportion
of those types of claims asserted against the debtor,24 but some
degree of balance is obviously desirable. Alternatively, members
of the unofficial committee organized by the creditors before the
order for relief may be appointed to the official committee if
they were fairly chosen and are representative of the different
kinds of claims against the debtor.25
The functions of a Chapter 11 creditors' committee are
broad and varied. Section 1103(c) provides, first, that the com-
mittee may "consult with the trustee or debtor in possession
concerning the administration of the case. ' 26 Presumably, that
ability will now include a right of consultation over the debtor-
employer's prerejection proposal to the union. Normally, a
20. 727 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1984). The court of appeals cited several other instances in
which labor organizations had been appointed to creditors' committees. Id. at 89 n.2.
However, as the bankruptcy court in Altair earlier pointed out, "in those cases, the issue
of the [union's] right to serve on the committees does not appear to have been consid-
ered by the courts. Certainly, there was no objection raised by the debtors as in the case
at bench." In re Altair Airlines, Inc., 25 B.R. 223, 225 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982).
21. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1)(1984); see also 11 U.S.C. § 151102(a)(1984).
22. At the request of a "party in interest," the court may also appoint additional
committees of creditors or equity security holders if necessary to assure adequate repre-
sentation of their interest. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2)(1984).
23. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1)(1984).
24. See DeNatale, The Creditors' Committee Under the Bankruptcy Code - A Pri-
mer, 55 Am. BANKS. L.J. 43, 50 (1981).
25. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1)(1984).
26. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1)(1984).
1984]
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debtor submits orders to the committee prior to submitting
them to the court, and thus allows the committee to review the
proposed actions and make its own determinations.27 The legiti-
mate purview of the committee would therefore extend to evalu-
ating and commenting upon the debtor-employer's formal appli-
cation to the bankruptcy court for permission to reject the
contract.
The investigatory function of a creditors' committee is also
very important in a Chapter 11 proceeding, particularly when
the reorganization is large and complex. The Code provides that
a committee may "investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabili-
ties, and financial condition of the debtor, the operation of the
debtor's business, and the desirability of the continuance of such
business, and any other matter relevant to the case or to the
formulation of a plan."28 This would seem to give the committee
virtually carte blanche access to the debtor's financial records, a
right considerably broader than that of the union under the re-
cent Code's provision for "such relevant information as is neces-
sary to evaluate the [employer's] proposal." '29
Finally, the committee is authorized to participate in the
formulation of the debtor's reorganization plan and to solicit ac-
ceptances or rejections of that plan from various creditors.30 If
the debtor should lose its exclusive right to file a plan, the com-
mittee, or any other "interested party," may file one.3 As a
practical matter, the negotiation of a reorganization plan is often
the most important and complicated function the committee
performs.
It is apparent, therefore, that the creditors' committee plays
an important role in a Chapter 11 reorganization proceeding.3 2
Accordingly, it is not surprising that unions representing a
debtor's employees seek to participate in the reorganization pro-
cess through membership on such a committee.
27. See DeNatale, supra note 24, at 52.
28. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(2)(1984).
29. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(B)(1984).
30. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(3)(1984).
31. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c)(1984).
32. See In re Johns-Manville, 26 B.R. 919, 925 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
[Vol. 35
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II. PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE APPOINTMENT OF UNION
REPRESENTATIVES TO CREDITORS' COMMITTEES
In many respects, labor unions are unique institutions, in
large part because of their unique relationship with both the em-
ployees they represent and with the employers with which they
negotiate collective bargaining agreements. Most labor unions
are, in a legal sense, "unincorporated associations"; 33 member-
ship in these employee associations is voluntary and is a matter
of contract.3 4 One of the usual terms of the membership contract
is that the employee-member appoints the union as his or her
agent to negotiate and agree upon the terms and conditions of
the employee-member's employment with a particular
employer.
3 5
A union's power to represent employees is, however, consid-
erably broader than its ability to bargain on behalf of its actual
members. Under federal law, once a union is selected as bargain-
ing representative by a majority of employees in a particular em-
ployment unit, that. union becomes the exclusive bargaining rep-
resentative of all the employees in that unit, whether or not they
are members of the union or individually consent to such repre-
sentation.38 At that point, the union has not only that power,
but also the duty to provide "fair representation" to each em-
ployee for whom it is a statutory agent.37 Unlike other business
entities with which an employer might possibly contract, a union
has the power under federal law to compel an employer to deal
with it. Additionally, federal law dictates the subject matter and
method of the bargaining process.38 The result of the heavily
33. At common law unions could neither sue nor be sued in their own name. See,
e.g., Baskins v. UMWA, 150 Ark. 398, 234 S.W. 464 (1921); Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass.
572, 78 N.E. 753 (1906). Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley)
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(b)(1982), changed that as a matter of federal law, and most states
have also recognized the "standing" of such associations. See A. THIEBLOT & T. HAG-
GARD, UNION VIOLENCE - THE RECORD AND THE RESPONSE BY COURTS, LEGISLATURES, AND
THE NLRB (1983) 473 n. 63 & 64.
34. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 192 (1967).
35. For an example of an authorization form used by a union, see J. SWANN, NLRB
ELECTIONS: A GUIDEBOOK FOR EMPLOYERS (1980) 114-15.
36. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)(1982); see generally R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW (1976) 374-81.
37. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); see generally R. GORMAN,
supra note 36, at 695-728.
38. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (d)(1982); see generally R. GORMAN, supra note 36, at 399-
19841
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regulated bargaining process, a so-called "collective bargaining
agreement," is itself something of an anomaly. Under the com-
mon law, there was serious doubt whether a collective bargaining
agreement was an enforceable "contract," and if so, of what sort
it was.39 Section 301 of the LMRA40 ultimately resolved the, is-
sue in favor of enforceability. Section 8(d)4 1 of the LMRA also
makes an employer's mid-term repudiation of a collective bar-
gaining agreement an unfair labor practice.
The Supreme Court in Bildisco held that collective bargain-
ing agreements were subject to mid-term rejection under the
Bankruptcy Code and that a Chapter 11 debtor-employer's uni-
lateral suspension of performance, pending court approval of
that rejection, was not an unfair labor practice. However, the
Court also stated that federal labor laws otherwise continue to
apply during the reorganization process, so that the debtor-in-
possession remains legally "obligated to bargain collectively with
the employees' certified representative over the terms of a new
contract pending rejection of the existing contract or following
formal approval of rejection by the bankruptcy court." ' 2
In sum, it is apparent that the nature and function of a la-
bor union, and the statutory rights it has vis-a-vis the debtor,
are radically different from those of other business entities that
have an interest in Chapter 11 reorganizations. Further, the
source of a union's purported interest in Chapter 11 proceedings,
a collective bargaining agreement, materially differs from an or-
dinary commercial contract. It is therefore understandable that
the appointment of labor union representatives to creditors'
committees poses rather complex legal problems.
A. The Union as a "Creditor"
To be eligible for appointment to a creditors' committee, a
union must first qualify as a "creditor." Unions generally base
39. See, e.g., Gregory, The Collective Bargaining Agreement: Its Nature and Scope,
1949 WASH. U.L.Q. 3, 11-13. Another leading author has noted that "[t]he collective
agreement differs as much from a common contract as Humpty Dumpty differs from a
common egg." Summers, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration or Alice Through the
Looking Glass, 2 BuFF. L. Rav. 1, 17 (1952).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)(1982).
41. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1982).
42. 104 S. Ct. at 1201.
524 [Vol. 35
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their argument for creditor status on one of the following four
types of claims: (1) claims for withheld union dues which the
debtor-employer has not forwarded to the union; (2) claims for
unpaid contributions to union pension and welfare plans; (3)
claims for unpaid wages; and (4) claims for damages flowing
from the debtor-employer's rejection of the collective bargaining
agreement.
Section 101(9) defines a "creditor" as an "entity that has a
claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the
order for relief' 43 or which the law treats as having arisen at
that time. A union can easily maintain that it is an "entity."
Under section 101(14), 44 an "entity" includes a "person"; under
section 101(33),"5 "person" includes a "corporation"; under sec-
tion 101(3), 46 "corporation" includes an "unincorporated com-
pany or association"; and the legislative history clearly indicates
that Congress intended for "unincorporated associations" to in-
clude labor organizations.4
A labor union may have more difficulty, however, establish-
ing that it has a "claim" against the debtor. Section 101(4) de-
fines "claim" in terms of a "right to payment. ' 48 Certainly a la-
bor union has a "right to payment" of the union dues which the
employer is obligated to forward under an agreement. The other
payments which the employer is obligated to make are actually
owed to the individual employees (in the case of wages), to a
pension fund administrator or plan (in the case of employer pen-
sion fund contributions), to an insurance carrier (in the case of
insurance premiums), or to some other third party, and not to
the union as an entity in its own right. With respect to these
obligations, it is difficult to see how the union has a "right to
payment." Indeed, failure to establish a "right to payment" was
one of the reasons why the bankruptcy court in In re Altair Air-
43. 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(1984).
44. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14)(1984).
45. 11 U.S.C. § 101(33)(1984).
46. 11 U.S.C. § 101(3)(1984).
47. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 309, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5787, 6266; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 22, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5787. See also In re Schatz Federal Bearings Co., 5 B.R. 543,
546 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980).
48. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(1984).
19841 525
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lines49 declined to appoint a representative of the Air Line Pi-
lots Association to the creditors' committee of Altair Airlines.
Although the debtor airline owed the pilots, in the aggregate,
$676,120 in unpaid wages and fringe benefits, which was the sec-
ond largest claim against it, the bankruptcy court concluded
that the "right to payment" for these claims lay in the individ-
ual employees, and as a result, the Pilots Association did not
qualify for membership on the creditors' committee."
The court also concluded that the Association lacked stand-
ing to assert a claim or to serve on the creditors' committee as
the agent of the individual employees. While noting that under
the old bankruptcy act the definition of "creditor" specifically
included a "duly authorized agent, attorney, or proxy," the court
observed that this language was omitted from the new Code.
The court construed this omission as a clear manifestation of
congressional intent to preclude the appointment of representa-
tives to creditors' committees."1 In this regard, the court appar-
ently believed that the Supreme Court's decision in Nathanson
v. NLRB5 2 was implicitly superceded by certain provisions of the
new Code.
The Nathanson Court, citing the statutory definition of
"creditor" which then included the "agent" of anyone to whom a
debt was owed,53 held that the National Labor Relations Board
had standing to file proof of a claim for the back wages that the
Board had ordered the bankrupt to pay its employees as a result
of unfair labor practices. The Court noted that
[t]he Board is the public agent chosen by Congress to enforce
the National Labor Relations Act .... A back pay order is a
reparation order designed to vindicate the public policy of the
statute by making the employees whole for losses suffered on
account of an unfair labor practice .... Congress has made
the Board the only party entitled to enforce the Act.'
It is unclear whether the new Code overruled Nathanson on
this narrow question; even if it did not, its facts are easily distin-
49. 25 B.R. 223 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982).
50. Id. at 225.
51. Id. at 224-25.
52. 344 U.S. 25 (1952).
53. Current version codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(1984).
54. Id. at 27.
526 [Vol. 35
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guished from a situation involving a labor union's claims of
"creditor" status vis-a-vis debts that have accrued to employees
under a collective bargaining agreement. The latter situation
does not involve the enforcement of a federal statute; failure to
pay wages under a collective bargaining agreement is merely the
breach of a contract, not an unfair labor practice. A breach-of-
contract award for back pay, although certainly consistent with
federal labor policy, is essentially a matter of private relief and
not the vindication of public rights. Unlike an NLRB back pay
order, which can be enforced only by the Board, debts owed
under a collective bargaining agreement may be enforced by in-
dividual employees.55
The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision
in Altair. Although its order is unreported," the district court
apparently relied on language in In re Schatz Federal Bearings
Co.5" to support the conclusion that a union is not a creditor
with respect to unpaid wage claims.5 8 In Schatz, the union
sought appointment to a creditors' committee by virtue of its
claim to $462,843 in unpaid pension fund contributions. The
court recognized the union as the "creditor" with respect to
these monies, noting that "unlike wages, which are owed to and
enforceable by the debtor's employees, the pension plan pay-
ments are funding contributions under a collectively bargained
labor agreement."59 The court in Altair interpreted this lan-
55. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962); In re Cortland Container
Corp., 30 B.R. 715 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983). Contra In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 33 B.R. 1
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1983), where the court unequivocally stated, in connection with a suit
over alleged improprieties in the administration of a collective bargaining agreement
pension plan, that "[t]he individual workers have no standing to assert claims based on
alleged violations of a collective bargaining agreement." Id. at 3. The court, however, was
undoubtedly mistaken. The authority cited by the court, Ramsey v. Signal Delivery
Serv., Inc., 631 F.2d 1210, 1212 (5th Cir. 1980), stands for the proposition that individual
employees cannot be sued for their breaches of the collective bargaining agreement, a
correct conclusion. See Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962). The court in
Braniff erred in assuming that the converse of that is also true.
56. See In re Altair Airlines, Inc., 727 F.2d 88, 88 (3d Cir. 1984).
57. 5 B.R. 543 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980).
58. 727 F.2d at 89 (the court of appeals indicated that the district court had relied
on Schatz).
59. 5 B.R. at 545 (emphasis added). The distinction drawn by the court in Schatz is
unconvincing. First, unpaid wages are usually no less an obligation "under a collective
bargaining agreement" than are unpaid pension contributions. Second, the wage provi-
sions of a collective bargaining agreement are as "enforceable" by a union as they are by
individual employees. Finally, pension payments are not usually paid to the union any
11
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guage as implying that a union would not qualify as a "creditor"
with respect to unpaid wages, and as a result the court rejected
the union's claim. On appeal, the debtor-employer in Altair thus
characterized the test in terms of a union's right to actually "col-
lect" the debt, in contrast to serving merely as a conduit through
which the payment is made. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals
found this distinction "entirely too metaphysical. 6 0 The court
noted that the Bankruptcy Code recognizes estates and trusts as
entities capable of having claims against debtors, and that "[tihe
representative capacity of such fiduciaries is essentially no dif-
ferent, for purposes of participation in a creditors' committee,
than the representative capacity, under federal common law, of
a labor organization." 61
The court of appeals in Altair adopted a different test for
determining whether an entity like a labor union has a "right to
payment," and is therefore a "creditor" with a "claim" against
the debtor, thus making the union eligible to serve on a credi-
tors' committee, by focusing on the entity's standing to bring the
claim. Under the Altair analysis, an entity with standing to sue
on a claim is necessarily a "creditor" with respect to that claim.
Noting that federal law permits a labor union to enforce the
terms of a collective bargaining agreement in the federal courts,
including suits for unpaid wages and vacation pay, the court ap-
parently concluded that, as a matter of logic, a union is a "credi-
tor" with respect to those wage claims.62 The notion that having
the right to sue to enforce the contract under which a debt arises
makes one a "creditor" in the statutory sense was explored more
fully by the bankruptcy court in Schatz. Schatz, in fact, adopted
the standing test as controlling with respect to unpaid pension
more than are wage payments. Indeed, in Schatz, the pension payments were to be made
to a specific insurance company, a company which the debtor had correctly listed as a
"creditor" in the case. But cf. Johnson v. England, 356 F.2d 44, 51 (9th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 961 (1966)(identifying the employees as "creditors" with respect to un-
paid pension fund contributions).
60. 727 F.2d at 90.
61. Id. The court's analogy, however, ignores certain distinctions. Trusts and estates
are entitled to "collect" debts owed the beneficiary or deceased, and payment to the
trust or estate discharges the debt. P. HASKELL, PREFACE TO THE LAW OF TRUSTS 107
(1975); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 177 (1959). In contrast, a union has no right
to collect or to receive the wages due an employee, and any such payment would cer-
tainly not discharge the employer's debt to the employee.
62. 727 F.2d at 90.
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fund contributions.6 3 This standing-equals-creditor analysis,
however, is flawed. Under federal law, many entities, including
the Secretary of Labor,64 have authority to enforce an em-
ployer's contractual obligation to fund a pension plan. Not all of
these entities, however, have a "claim" against the debtor in the
sense that they have a "right to payment."'65 Additionally, the
Schatz/Altair approach fails to account for the difference be-
tween a "right to payment" and a "right to compel payment."
Although the triangular employer/union/employee relationship
and the collective bargaining agreement regulating it are unique
in many respects, the closest common law analogy is to a third
party beneficiary arrangement. In the simplest example of a
third party beneficiary arrangement, A, for adequate considera-
tion, makes a promise to B to pay C $100. If A fails to perform
and C's .rights under the contract have vested, then C may sue to
recover the $100. C, in other words, has a "right to payment" of
$100; C has a "claim" against A; and C is thus a "creditor"
under the Code. B, of course, would also have a cause of action,
because A has breached the contract. B could thus sue to compel
A to make payment to C. B's suit, however, would have to be in
the form of an equitable action for specific performance; under
the Bankruptcy Code, a right to an equitable remedy does not
give rise to a "claim" unless the breach could also be translated
into monetary damages.6 Certainly the original obligee of a
third party beneficiary contract may suffer monetary damages
when the obligor fails to make payment to the beneficiary. How-
ever, the measure of those damages is not the amount the obli-
gor promised to pay to the beneficiary; it is the economic injury
that the original obligee suffered as a consequence of the breach.
With respect to those damages, the obligee B clearly has a "right
to payment" or a "claim" against the obligor A in that amount,
63. 5 B.R. at 547-48. The court concluded that although the union had no right to
sue under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§
1001-1461 (1982), it could sue under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations (Taft-
Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)(1982), because the employer's funding obligation under
the pension plan had been incorporated by reference into the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement.
64. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(5)(1982).
65. See Soble, Eggerstsen & Bernstein, Pension Related Claims in Bankruptcy, 56
AM. BANKR. L.J. 155, 174 (1982).
66. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(b)(1984); see 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPrCY 101.04 at 101-16.2
(15th ed. 1983).
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and is thus a "creditor" who, if the amount of that claim is
among the top seven claims, is entitled to sit on the creditors'
committee.
The right of the union representative to be a member of the
creditors' committee should be evaluated in a similar fashion. If
a debtor-employer has breached its duty under a collective bar-
gaining agreement to pay its employees wages or to contribute to
a pension or welfare fund, then the union which has suffered a
breach of contract is certainly a "creditor" under the Bank-
ruptcy Code with respect to any damages that flow to it from
that breach. The ranking that the union enjoys as a creditor
must be determined, however, not by reference to the total
amount of payments owed to third parties (i.e. payments owed
to employees, pension fund administrators and others), but
rather by reference to whatever incidental damages the union
suffers as a result of the breach.6
A union's status as the statutory "agent" of the employees
does not improve its position as a would-be "creditor." This lack
of creditor status does not result because agents necessarily lack
standing under the Code, notwithstanding the contrary implica-
tions of Altair. The omission of any reference to "agents" in the
Code's definition of "creditors" is more readily explained by the
redundancy of any such inclusion: if a person is qualified to file
a claim, then that person's agent is necessarily similarly quali-
fied. The agent's status does not necessarily result in creditor
status because being the agent of 100 creditors who each have a
$100 "claim" against a debtor does not make that agent a
$10,000 "creditor" under the Bankruptcy Code, whether the in-
dividual creditors are small businesses and tradesmen, or indi-
vidual employees.
In sum, if the term "creditor" is given its ordinary and in-
tended meaning, then it would be a rare case indeed in which a
labor union would be legally entitled to sit on a creditors' com-
mittee. Moreover, even if the right to bring a lawsuit is sufficient
to qualify the union as a creditor, there are still other reasons
why an entity of this nature should not be appointed to a credi-
tors' committee.
67. See Soble, Eggerstsen & Bernstein, supra note 65, at 174.
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B. The "Conflict of Interest" Problem
Under the old bankruptcy act, the most common disqualifi-
cation of a creditor from membership on the creditors' commit-
tee was the existence of conflicts of interest between that credi-
tor and others."' Because of the increased importance of the
creditors' committee under the Bankruptcy Code, it is believed
that the pre-Code conflict-of-interest rules will continue to ap-
ply, perhaps even more strictly. 9 Assuming that under a broad
definition of the term, a labor union somehow qualifies as a
"creditor" whose claim is of sufficient size to make it otherwise
eligible for membership on the creditors' committee, considera-
ble conflict-of-interest problems remain.
The most obvious conflict arises from the fact that the
union's primary interest in representing the employees often will
not be the collection of the debt which qualified the union as a
"creditor," but rather the immediate preservation of jobs. This
interest, however, may conflict with the interests of the other
creditors in reducing the workforce or liquidating the business in
order to preserve the debtor's estate.70
This conflict-of-interest argument, made to both the bank-
ruptcy court in Schatz and the Third Circuit in Altair, was not
successful in either case. The court in Altair responded that
"[s]uch conflicts of interest are not unusual in reorganizations.
Materialman creditors, for example, may sometimes prefer to
forego full payment for past sales in hopes of preserving a cus-
tomer, while lenders may prefer liquidation and prompt pay-
ment. ' 71 Moreover, one of the functions of the creditors' com-
mittee is to study the debtor's business and "the desirability of
the continuance of such business. '7 2 The court further reasoned
that if the voice of the creditor most interested in continuance is
68. Meir & Brown, Representing Creditors' Committees Under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code, 56 AM. BANKu_ L.J. 217, 219 (1982).
69. Id. The House Report referred to creditors' committees as "representative bod-
ies which must speak for groups of creditors with similar interests." H.R. REP. No. 595,
95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 235 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 5963
(emphasis added). See also In re Johns-Manville Corp., 26 B.R. 919, 924-25 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1983).
70. See Soble, Eggerstsen & Bernstein, supra note 65, at 174.
71. 727 F.2d at 90. See also 5 B.R. at 548.
72. 727 F.2d at 90 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(2)).
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not heard, the committee cannot make a fair and reasoned deci-
sion on that issue.7  The Altair court's reasoning is unpersua-
sive. First, it simply assumes that materialman creditors would
likewise not be subject to disqualification due to divergency of
their interests from those of other creditors.7 4 Indeed, in such a
situation, two committees might be appropriate.7 5 Further, the
union's interest in being heard can be served in other ways. The
Code itself contemplates the right of a "party in interest" to be
heard on the merits of a reorganization plan. 6 More specifically,
Bankruptcy Rule 2018(d) provides:
In a Chapter 9 or 11 case, a labor union or employees' associa-
tion, representative of employees of the debtor, shall have the
right to be heard on the economic soundness of a plan affecting
the interests of the employees but it may not appeal from any
judgment, order, or decree in the case unless otherwise permit-
ted by law.
77
Alternatively, it has been suggested that a union representative
be appointed as an ex officio, nonvoting member of the credi-
torS78 or otherwise asked to participate informally in some of the
committee's functions.79 Either approach would allow due recog-
nition to the union's primary interest in the preservation of jobs,
while preventing that recognition from conflicting with the other
creditors' primary interests in collecting their debts.
There are, however, additional conflict-of-interest problems.
One problem arises when the union's status as a "creditor" is
73. Id. at 90-91. It should be noted that as soon as the bankruptcy court in Schatz
approved the sale of the debtor's business to a third party, with whom the union then
negotiated a new labor contract, the union sought and obtained the court's permission to
withdraw from the committee. Such a course of conduct may be taken as evidence of the
narrowness of the union's interest in these matters. In re Schatz Federal Bearings Co., 11
B.R. 363 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
74. See generally 5 COLLIER BANKRuPTcY PRAcTIcE GUIDE 83.03[2] (1984)(the exis-
tence of possible adverse interests should not automatically bar an unsecured creditor
from serving on a creditors' committee).
75. See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcY 1102.02 at 1102-14 (15th ed. 1983) ("where
there are significant groups of creditors or equity security holders with conflicting claims
which are likely to be affected by the plan of reorganization, the court should authorize
the appointment of additional committees").
76. 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b)(1984); see Soble, Eggerstsen & Bernstein, supra note 65, at
174 n. 113.
77. Bankr. Rule 2018(d).
78. DeNatale, supra note 24, at 57 n.71.
79. 5 COLLIER BANKRuPrcY PRAcTIcE GUmE 83.04[1] (1984).
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allegedly based on the debtor-employer's unpaid contributions
to a pension plan. As the surrogate creditor, the union would be
expected to represent all of the intended beneficiaries of the
plan, including active employees and retirees. The two groups,
however, do not have concurrent interests. Active employees are
usually more interested in preserving their jobs than they are in
providing full funding to the pension plan, while pensioners
have the opposite interest.80 Moreover, the union is not free to
compromise or accommodate these two interests. Under the
LMRA, the union has a combined right/duty (with the emphasis
here upon the element of "duty") to represent the interests of
active employees within a collective bargaining unit.81 In Allied
Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,8 2 the
Supreme Court, in an analogous situation, held that this duty of
representation precluded the union from attempting to bargain
on behalf of the retired employees over certain changes the em-
ployer had made to health benefits. Similarly, if a union at-
tempts to serve as the "representative creditor" of the benefi-
ciaries of a pension plan, it would seem that there is a high
probability of its violating one of two different fiduciary duties,
either that owed under the Bankruptcy Code to all beneficiaries,
including retirees, or that owed under the LMRA only to active
employees within the bargaining unit.
This conflict would not, however, preclude a union represen-
tative from serving on a creditors' committee in the capacity of a
union-appointed trustee of a jointly administered Taft-Hartley
Act trust.83 In such a capacity, the union representative's real
interests may still lie in favor of active employees, but the con-
flict of interest has already been resolved: the labor-law duty of
fair representation is subordinated by federal statute to the du-
ties of the plan trustee. The Employee Retirement Income Se-
curity Act (ERISA)s4 dictates that the union-appointed repre-
80. Soble, Eggerstsen & Bernstein, supra note 65, at 175; DeNatale, supra note 24,
at 57-58.
81. See supra note 37.
82. 404 U.S. 157 (1971).
83. See generally Soble, Eggerstsen & Bernstein, supra note 65, at 175-77 (discuss-
ing the priority that plan trustees must place upon the interests of the plan participants,
as required by ERISA).
84. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982).
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sentatives serve the interests of all plan participants. 5 The
courts have held that this fiduciary duty is breached when the
exclusive interests of the union or of its active members are
given priority.88 Similar statutory protection of all plan partici-
pants is lacking, however, when a union attempts to gain credi-
tor status in its own right rather than as a plan trustee.
The union's duty, under federal labor law, to represent vig-
orously the interests of bargaining unit employees may conflict
with its duties as a member of the creditors' committee in yet
another way. Under the recently enacted Code provisions, the
debtor-employer is required to propose contract modifications
that "assure that all creditors, the debtor and all of the affected
parties are treated fairly and equitably.i' 7 Presumably, if the
proposal meets that requirement, the members of the creditors'
committee must view it favorably. As a member of that commit-
tee, a union representative would have the duty to support such
a proposal or, at least, to refrain from active, partisan opposi-
tion. A proposal that is fair to "all creditors" and to other "af-
fected parties," including equity stockholders, is not necessarily
a proposal that is in the best interests of the employees as a
separate class. Yet, in its capacity as the statutory bargaining
representative of these employees, the union is compelled by
federal law to represent only the employer's special interests,
even at the expense of the interests of other creditors.88 In short,
the union's duties as a member of the creditors' committee are
inherently inconsistent with its duties as a bargaining
representative.
Moreover, while bargaining over the debtor-employer's pro-
posed modifications, the union apparently retains the right to
strike. The new Code provision certainly does not prohibit it.
Although the bankruptcy court, under its broad section 105 eq-
85. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1982).
86. See, e.g., Blankenship v. Boyle, 329 F. Supp. 1089, 1094-95 (D.D.C. 1971).
87. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A)(1984).
88. Presumably, a union's refusal to accept proposed modifications that are fair to
all of the creditors as a class would be deemed "without good cause," thus freeing the
court to approve the debtor-employer's rejection of the contract. That, however, is not
the end of the union's influence, as it can still use economic power to prevent the debtor-
employer from putting the rejection into effect. See infra notes 89-92 and accompanying
text.
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uity powers,8 9 would otherwise have the power to enjoin such an
egregious interference with the reorganization process, in analo-
gous contexts the courts have held that the anti-injunction pro-
visions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act control. For example, un-
ions have been allowed to strike to compel continued adherence
to the terms of a contract even after a bankruptcy court has ap-
proved its rejection"0 and to strike in support of its demands for
a new contract."1 Although such conduct may not be affirma-
tively illegal under the Bankruptcy Code, it is certainly inconsis-
tent with the fiduciary duties of a member of the creditors' com-
mittee. Such a strike not only puts the union at an unfair
advantage vis-a-vis the other creditors, but, more importantly, it
may frustrate the entire reorganization process, driving the
debtor into an otherwise unnecessary liquidation.2
This conflict between a union's duty under the federal labor
laws to represent vigorously the special interests of the debtor's
employees and its fiduciary duties as a member of a creditors'
committee is somewhat analogous to the conflict that arose in In
re Johns-Manville Corp.93 There, an attorney for an asbestos
claimant continued a state court legal action even after Manville
had filed under Chapter 11 and the automatic stay against such
actions had come into effect. The attorney apparently acted on
the theory that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction. The
court not only found the attorney in contempt, but also disquali-
fied him from further membership on the creditors' committee.
The court noted the critical role of the members of a creditors'
committee in negotiating a plan of reorganization, in supervising
the debtor, and in protecting their constituents' interests:
Accordingly, the individuals constituting a committee should
89. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a)(1984).
90. See, e.g., Crowe & Assocs. v. Bricklayers Local 2, 713 F.2d 211 (6th Cir. 1983);
Petrusch v. Teamsters Local 317, 667 F.2d 297 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 974
(1982); Briggs Transp. Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2241
(D. Minn. 1984).
91. See In re Gray Truck Line Co., 34 B.R. 174, 179 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1983) (dicta).
92. "The argument that [the debtor-employer] may go out of business absent the
requested injunction is no more than a recognition that one of the unfortunate side ef-
fects of labor-management strife is economic loss to the employers and employees."
Briggs Transp. Co., 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2244. See also Crowe & Assocs., 713 F.2d at
216; Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Bohack Corp., 541 F.2d 312, 318 (2d Cir. 1976); Petrusch
v. Teamsters Local 317, 14 B.R. 825, 830 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1981).
93. 26 B.R. 919 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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be honest, loyal, trustworthy, and without conflicting interests,
and with undivided loyalty and allegiance to their constitu-
ents .... Conflicts of interest on the part of representative
persons or committees are thus not [to] be tolerated ...
Thus, where a committee representative or agent seeks to re-
present or advance the interest of an individual member of a
competing class of creditors or various interests or groups
whose purposes and desires are dissimilar, this fiduciary is in
breach of his duty of loyal and disinterested service .'
The court then found that in at least three ways the attorney's
functions on the committee and his larger fiduciary duty to the
estate were in conflict with his actions and duties on behalf of a
single claimant. First, the court noted that in the state court
proceeding the attorney was contesting the very jurisdiction of
the bankruptcy court, while as a committee member he was
sanctioning the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction by working
within its framework to foster his constituents' interests in the
context of a reorganization plan.95 A union which strikes over
the proposed rejection of a collective bargaining agreement and
then contests the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to enjoin that
strike would be in a similar position.9 6
Second, the court in Manville noted that the attorney's ac-
tions in independently prosecuting a law suit in state court were
"designed to benefit his client. . . and/or his own private inter-
ests in particular as opposed to benefitting [sic] all members of
the asbestos claimants class which he represents as a committee
member and fiduciary. '9 7 The court pointed out that because
the interests of a single asbestos litigant may differ substantially
from the interests of all asbestos claimants, one of these inter-
ests is bound to suffer as a result of the attorney's dual represen-
94. Id. at 925.
95. Id. at 926.
96. Although several lower courts have held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act deprives
the bankruptcy court of jurisdiction to enjoin such a strike, see cases cited supra at notes
90.91; the Supreme Court has never addressed the question. Thus, the correctness of
those decisions may certainly be questioned. See generally Note, The Automatic Stay of
the 1978 Bankruptcy Code Versus the Norris-LaGuardia Act: A Bankruptcy Court's
Dilemma, 61 Tnx. L. Rv. 321 (1982). Because the issue is still unsettled, it is quite
probable that a union might pursue the dual strategy of striking over a collective bar-
gaining agreement and contesting the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to enjoin the
strike.
97. 26 B.R. at 926.
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tation.9a A union's action in making interim wage and benefit
demands, in going on strike to enforce them, or even in filing
unfair labor practice charges would similarly be expected to ben-
efit the special interests of the union and of the employees it
represents, rather than the creditors as a class, who may indeed
be positively harmed by such conduct.
Third, the court noted that as a member of the committee
the attorney had access to confidential information regarding
Manville's reorganization plans and operations, "which informa-
tion is not intended to be used in fostering the rights of private
litigants outside the context of protecting these creditors as a
group in these bankruptcy proceedings." '99 In Schatz, a similar
objection was made to the appointment of the union to the cred-
itors' committee, but the court discounted it. There, the court
reasoned that because of the employer's status as a Chapter 11
debtor, much of the information revealed to the creditors' com-
mittee could be obtained by the union through alternative chan-
nels.100 It is not clear exactly what the court had in mind. The
new labor provisions of the Bankruptcy Code would, of course,
have entitled the union to whatever information it needed in or-
der to evaluate the debtor-employer's proposed modifications. 101
Also, to the extent that it applies to bargaining at that stage,102
the LMRA would impose a similar duty.10 3 However, the quan-
tum and nature of information that the union may obtain as a
member of the creditors' committee is considerably broader. Ap-
parently recognizing the inherent danger of granting a union
free access to the debtor-employer's business files and records,
98. Id.
99. Id. See also In re Wilson Foods Corp., 31 B.R. 272 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983)
(disqualification of a creditor who also happened to be a substantial competitor).
100. 5 B.R. at 548.
101. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(B)(1984). The court may also enter a protective order
where further disclosure by the union "would compromise the position of the debtor with
respect to its competitors in the industry in which it is engaged." 11 U.S.C. §
1113(d)(3)(1984).
102. See supra note 13.
103. Under the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(5)(1982), a union has a right to obtain from the employer information that is
directly relevant to the union's collective bargaining duties. See generally C. MoRRis,
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 606-29 (2d ed. 1983). In particular, when an employer
claims an "inability to pay," as would the debtor in the context of bankruptcy, then it
must be possible to substantiate that claim with relevant financial data. NLRB v. Truitt
Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
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the court in Schatz also noted that it had the power to issue
protective orders.104
III. CONCLUSION
Certainly, the employees of a Chapter 11 debtor-employer,
and the union representing them, have a legitimate interest in
an attempted reorganization. It is not an interest, however, that
warrants membership on the official unsecured creditors' com-
mittee. A union qualifies as a major "creditor" only in a loose
and figurative sense of the word. Even if the prevailing defini-
tion of that term is correct, the union's real or primary interest
will often lie not in the collection of the funds owed it or its
members, already afforded some degree of priority, but in insur-
ing the continuation of the business. Thus, a union would obtain
membership on the creditors' committee by reference to one in-
terest, but then use that membership to promote quite a differ-
ent interest.
Moreover, a union's duties as the employees' exclusive bar-
gaining agent under the federal labor laws potentially conflict
with the duties that a union would have as a member of the
committee. Indeed, to the extent that the union through the ne-
gotiation of high wages and restrictive work rules, may have con-
tributed significantly to the very financial condition that the
Chapter 11 debtor and its committee of creditors attempt to re-
solve, the union could be deemed to be in an "adversarial" posi-
tion with respect to the other creditors.
The exclusion of union representatives from the official
creditors' committee does not leave union and employee inter-
ests unprotected. The new Code provisions give a union rights
concerning the rejection of existing collective bargaining agree-
ments enjoyed by no other party to an executory contract with
the debtor. Moreover, under the LMRA, the debtor-employer
remains obliged to continue to recognize the union as the exclu-
sive representative of its employees and to bargain with it in
good faith over the terms of any new agreements that are
reached. It would seem that these rights, coupled with the
union's status as a "party in interest" with standing to be heard
104. 5 B.R. at 548.
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on the reorganization plan, give more than adequate protection
to the interests of the employees. The presence of a union repre-
sentative on the creditors' committee adds nothing to these
rights and only creates unnecessary conflict and confusion in the
statutory scheme.
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